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SAVING THE CONSTITUTION: LINCOLN,
SECESSION, AND THE PRICE OF UNION
Craig S. Lerner*
LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION.

Chicago Press. 2003. Pp.

ix,

B y Daniel Farber. Chicago: Universit y of
240. $27.50.

The year is 1860. After failing to obtain, as he had expected, the
Democratic Part y nomination for President at its Charleston
convention, Stephen Douglas abandons his candidac y. In the ensuing
election, Democrat John C. Breckinridge of Kentuck y edges
Republican Abraham Lincoln.1 The official platform of the
Democratic Part y includes endorsement of the Dred Scott decision,
slaver y's expansion in the federal territories, rigorous enforcement of
the Fugitive Slave Act, and elimination of the tariff. Abolitionists in
New England are inconsolable. For several years, Henr y Llo yd
Garrison had advocated Northern secession, denouncing the
Constitution as a "union with slaveholders," and "a covenant with
death and an agreement with Hell."2 Funded b y industrialists who see
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. A.B. 1987,
Harvard; M.A. 1990, University of Chicago; J.D. 1994, Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks
Peter Hansen, John Harper, Renee Lettow Lerner, Nelson Lund, Daniel Polsby, and Nancy
Tardy for helpful comments.

1. Douglas had been expected to receive the Democratic Party's nomination for
president in 1860, but at the convention in Charleston southerners revolted and eventually
rallied around Breckinridge instead. See Peter Knupfer, James Buchanan, the Election of
1860, and the Demise of Jacksonian Politics, in JAMES BUCHANAN AND THE POLITICAL
CRISIS OF THE 1850s (Michael J. Birkner ed., 1996). Douglas's decision to run as a
"Northern Democrat" splintered the anti-Lincoln vote. See Dep't of the Interior, Map of the
Presidential Election of 1860, http://teachpol.tcnj.edu/amer_pol_hist/thumbnail189.html (last
visited June 30, 2004). In the actual tally, Lincoln won 180 electoral votes (40% of popular
vote), Breckinridge 72 (18%), Constitutional Union candidate John Bell 39 (12%), and
Douglas 12 (30%). Had Douglas not run, Breckinridge would likely have won Virginia (15
electoral votes), Kentucky (12) and Tennessee (12), all of which were taken by John Bell. He
would also have won the two states taken by Douglas, Missouri (9) and Delaware (3), and
two of the states claimed by Lincoln, California (4) and Oregon (3). The most far-fetched
aspect of this hypothetical world is that Breckinridge wins Pennsylvania. In the actual
results, Lincoln won 268,030 votes to Breckinridge's 178,871. Even if we give all of Douglas's
votes (16,765) to Breckinridge, he would still trail by a substantial margin. But assuming that
New Yorker William Seward, who had been the original front-runner for the Republican
nomination, had declined to throw his zealous support behind Lincoln (which he did after
being promised a cabinet position), then Lincoln's showing in the mid-Atlantic region would
have been considerably impaired. Voila: Breckinridge pulls out a razor-thin victory in
Pennsylvania, claiming its 27 votes. The final electoral tally: Breckinridge 157, Lincoln 153.
2. For a sample of Garrison's incendiary rhetoric, see WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON,
DISUNION (1855), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=567.
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no advantage in remaining in a tariff-free Union, Garrison rallies
abolitionists in Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York, and the seven states
formally secede from the Union. President Breckinridge convenes a
Special Session of Congress on July 4, 1861, and proclaims: "The
States have their status in the Union, and the y have no other legal
status. If they break from us, they can onl y do so against law and by
revolution."3 Before rece 1v mg authorization from Congress,
Breckinridge calls up 75,000 troops and promises an invasion of New
England. Also without congressional approval, Breckinridge suspends
habeas corpus in "border states" like Pennsylvania and Delaware,
summaril y dispatching hundreds of citizens to prison.
In this hypothetical world, who would we sa y is in the right - the
seceding states or the President? Would preserving the Union justify
the slaughter of over 600,000 men, an assault on civil liberties, the
devastation of the national economy, and the subjugation of one
region of America to rule by the other for over a decade? If President
Breckinridge had, on a blood-soaked battlefield, touted the war as a
struggle to ensure "that government of the people, by the people, for
the people shall not perish from the earth," would we be persuaded, or
would we construe in such words a poetic inversion of the truth?
It is difficult for Americans today to take seriousl y the legal claims
in favor of a right of secession. The cause of secession in 1860 became
commingled with a defense of slavery, and our repugnance for that
institution carries over into our rejection of secession. Furthermore,
there is a sense among many Americans that our country has, on
balance, had a salutary influence on global affairs. Any suggestion that
we might have been better off as separate nations prompts a lecture
on the United States' role in the twentieth century as an agent of
freedom and the inevitable lament that, had America not been united,
Germany would have won World War II. The argument, however
flawed, 4 often suffices to cut short any argument over the merits of
secession and Union.
As Daniel Farber5 writes in Lincoln's Constitution, "we must . . .
put aside our revulsion against the Confederacy's proslavery aims.
Whether the Constitution provides states with an exit option does not

3. President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,
1861), http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=547&parent=63 [hereinafter Lincoln,
Message to Congress].
4. A divided America might not have entered, or perhaps would have only partially
entered, World War I. Absent American intervention, the warring parties might have sought
a negotiated truce. And without the punitive Treaty of Versailles, perhaps one could say: no
Nazism, no World War II, no Holocaust, etc.
5. Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California-Berkely and Henry J. Fletcher
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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depend on the state's motivation[]" (p. 81). Farber's book (and this
Review) are framed around two broad issues: First, did the South have
the right - either under the Constitution or some higher law - to
secede; or, as Lincoln argued, is "perpetuit y . . . implied . . . in the
fundamental law of all national governments"?6 Second, were
Lincoln's actions to preserve the Union consistent with the
Constitution; or did he exceed the powers delegated to him as the
chief executive? From a reviewer's point of view, Lincoln's
Constitution is a frustrating book: Farber is generall y balanced in his
presentation of conflicting views, and measured and fair in his
conclusions. How much easier m y task would be if Farber had chosen
sides, and declared himself in the camp of those who venerate Lincoln7
or abhor him.8
Farber's book is, nonetheless, unmistakabl y the work of a law
professor and not a historian. Farber is less interested in resolving
historical disputes than in anal yzing the legal questions that
confronted Lincoln - principall y of secession and civil liberties.
Often, however, the legal questions are enmeshed in historical
disputes, and in these instances Farber t ypicall y supplies citations to
secondar y literature for his controversial historical claims. And even
this much is sometimes missing. Farber mentions in passing that
"[General] Sherman's reputation [for brutalit y] is exaggerated" (p.
23), but he supplies no footnote to support a claim that would be
received in certain quarters in Atlanta with astonishment.9 Yet
whatever fascination the Civil War ma y hold for us as citizens and
historians, as law yers there is a nagging sense of: so what? It has long
since been decided that the states do not have a right to secede; 10 and

6. See First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4 1861), http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.
cfm?id=327&parent=63 [hereinafter, Lincoln First Inaugural).
7. See, e.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND
THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2000).
8. See, e.g., THOMAS J. DILORENZO, THE REAL LINCOLN: A NEW LOOK AT ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, HIS AGENDA AND AN UNNECESSARY WAR (2002).
9. Sherman himself might have been surprised by Farber's judgment: In his official
report on the March to the Sea, Sherman calculated the total damage as $100,000,000, an
astronomical sum for 1864, and of which, by Sherman's own estimate, only 20% achieved
any military advantage for the Union; the remainder was "simple waste and destruction."
RICHARD WHEELER, SHERMAN'S MARCH 131 (1978) (quoting Sherman's official report on
the march). Farber also contends that, with respect to Lincoln, "charges [of dictatorship)
were exaggerated," p. 20, and that "[r]oughly five percent of the military trials [he approved)
took place in uncontested territory" in the North, p. 164. In reaching these conclusions,
Farber seems to rely upon Mark Neely's fascinating work on the subject. MARK E. NEELY
JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991).
10. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868) ("When, therefore, Texas became
one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of
perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at
once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something
more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And
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whatever Lincoln's excesses as President, what's done is done.
Farber's sensible response is that the issue of secession, while in one
sense of antiquarian interest, still compels us to reflect upon the
nature of executive power in times of crisis and to consider whether
there are legitimate grounds to compel state participation in our
federal government.
Lincoln's Constitution is an admirable summar y of man y of the
constitutional arguments associated with Lincoln's name. Whether,
under the Constitution, the states have a right to secede, or,
correlativel y, whether the National Government has the right to use
force to prevent the dissolution of the Union are interesting questions.
More provocative, however, are the moral and philosophical issues
that lie behind the legal debate: when one people should be free to set
up a new government, even at the expense of an existing one; and
when, conversel y, a nation should acquiesce in its dismemberment
rather than compel a segment of the population to remain against its
wishes. In other words, even i f the Constitution rati fied in 1789 was
intended to foreclose a right of secession, might there be
circumstances in which a President should allow a section of the
nation, no longer linked b y interest and opinion to the rest, to simpl y
leave in peace? In the earl y da ys of the American republic, this
question was bandied about constantl y in American political
discourse ; since the Civil War, however, it has utterl y disappeared.
This fact testifies to the extent to which the regime that has emerged
from Lincoln's presidenc y is not quite the one that entered it; and
shows how an almost -m ystic devotion to the nation's territorial
integrit y has numbed critical reflections on the moral and
philosophical premises that underlie the modern American regime's
refusal to countenance a right of secession.
I.

A RIGHT OF SECESSION?

From the earliest da ys of the republic, Americans debated whether
the states had the right to nullify federal laws or, more dramaticall y,
secede from the Union.11 Although Farber's account suggests that
it was final.").

11. One commentator has noted:
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Northerners and Southerners alike manipulated
state sovereignty principles to serve their immediate political objectives. When the War of
1812 threatened New England's shipping and commercial interests, New England Federalists
called the Hartford Convention to consider seriously the wisdom of secession. Twenty years
later, when the "Abominable Tariff' of 1832 was enacted, South Carolinians preached John
C. Calhoun's doctrine of nullification. In another twenty years, radical northern abolitionists
embraced nullification principles in order to defeat the operation of the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850.
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61, 91 n.160 (1989). For a sketch of secession and nullification movements in American
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secessionism was a southern phenomenon, 12 the rall ying cr y was at
various times sounded throughout the nation. A biographer of John
Calhoun suggests a delicious iron y - that the young Calhoun,
destined to become the leader of southern nullification movements,
first heard secessionist arguments from the Reverend Timoth y
Dwight, the arch-Federalist president of Yale College, during
Jefferson's presidenc y.13 With Virginians claiming the Presidenc y in
the earl y nineteenth centur y, an embittered New England seized upon
various causes to threaten secession, culminating in the Hartford
Convention of 1815.14 Soon the southerners would raise the banner of
secession, first over tariffs designed to protect northern manufacturers
at the expense of southern consumers, and eventuall y over the
congeries of issues that clustered around slaver y (e.g. , the enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Act, the use of the mails to spread abolitionist
literature, and the expansion of slavery into the territories).15
In his anal ysis of secession, Farber follows a roughl y chronological
approach. He first considers whether the states were sovereign
political entities prior to the ratification of the Constitution (pp. 2644), then turns to the development, in the earl y years of the republic,
of the doctrine of state nullification. This doctrine prefigured the full
blown secession movements of the mid-nineteenth centur y (pp. 45-69).
Farber concludes with the question of secession proper, considering it
first as a constitutional right (pp. 70-91), and then as a right of
rebellion (pp. 92-114).

history, including Northern movements, see Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty:
Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of
Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L .J. 1229, 1242-54.
12. Farber begins his history of secession movements, pp. 8-25, with the Wilmot Proviso
debate in 1849, thus glossing over earlier New England secession movements. Although
Farber acknowledges in a footnote that northern secession movements arose "[a]t various
times in the nineteenth century," p. 215 n.27, in the text he treats secession as an exclusively
southern phenomenon, see, e.g., p. 21 ("Since 1800, Southerners had been arguing that the
states had the ultimate sovereign right to interpret the Constitution."). Others have noted
New England's flirtations with secession:
Never mind that New England's law-abiding statesmen retreated into states' rights
theorization after losing to Jefferson in 1800 or that they defied national law on a massive
scale during the War of 1812, and took their section to the brink of secession in the Hartford
Convention. New England rediscovered nationalism again in the 1820s when it suited its
economic interests.
R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States' Rights
Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 932 (2000).
13. See MARGARET L. COIT, JOHN c. CALHOUN 28 (1950).
14. See generally JAMES M. BANNER JR., TO THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE
FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS 1780-1815 (1970).
15. See generally DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861 (Henry Steele
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1976).
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The States as Sovereigns

The secession argument hinges in part on the claim that the states
were independent sovereigns prior to ratifying the Constitution and
that the y should therefore be able to reclaim their political
independence. If, however, the states were never sovereign entities,
then the case for the right to secede loses one of its fundamental
premises. Thus did Lincoln argue in his Special Address to Congress
on Jul y 4, 1861:
Having never been States, either i n substance o r i n name, outside o f the
Union, whence this magical omnipotence of "state rights," asserting a
claim of power to lawfully destroy the Union itself? Much is said about
the "sovereignty" of the States, but the word even is not in the national
Constitution, nor, as is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is
a "sovereignty" in the political sense of the term? Would it be far wrong
to define it "a political community without a political superior?" Tested
by this, no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and
even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union, by which act
she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States and the laws and
treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution to be
for her the supreme law of the land.16

The argument in Lincoln 's speech turns on a legal /political definition
of sovereignt y and a historical account of the nature of the states prior
to the Constitution's adoption.
In assessing this definitional issue, Farber sifts through various
ideas of sovereignt y, concluding that " [s]ince the Constitution never
expressl y invokes the concept of sovereignt y, it is onl y indirectl y
relevant to constitutional interpretation" (p. 44). Although it is true
that the Constitution never uses the word, the idea is embedded in
Article VII: "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall
be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the
S tates so ratifying the Same."17 The Constitution thus contemplates the
possibilit y that one, two, or three states would exist outside the Union.
If so, would not each of those states be "a political communit y without
a political superior"?18
In his assessment of Lincoln's historical account, Farber marshals
onl y a sampling of the evidence for and against before dismissing it as
" ambiguous" (p. 44). He notes that on the one hand, the Declaration
of Independence speaks of the colonies as "Free and Independent
States" (p. 35) and, in this vein, Luther Martin argued at the
16. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VII (emphasis added).
18. In fact, the Constitution went into effect in March 1789, but North Carolina and
Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution until November 1789 and May 1790. For about
a year, the United States treated these two states as separate sovereigns.
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Constitutional Convention that the colonies were, after severing ties
with England, "in a state of nature towards each other," each to be
regarded as "separate sovereignties" (p. 33). On the other hand, in
support of Lincoln's view, James Wilson argued at the Convention
that the colonies, having separated from the Crown, "were
independent, not Individually but Unitedly" (p. 35).
Wilson's view, embraced later by Lincoln, is hardl y a frivolous
position. After all, the former colonies that would later constitute the
United States did not have a long histor y of independent existence as,
for example, Norwa y did, when it seceded from Sweden in 1 905. Yet
each of the colonies could trace its origins back to separate grants
from the Crown; each had evolved with relativel y distinctive
indigenous political and cultural institutions; and there is considerable
evidence that, at least for some Americans, allegiance to their local
government trumped allegiance to the fledging union. 19
In the historical debate on the status of the states, Farber
ultimatel y positions himself in the middle - with Lincoln at the one
extreme (den ying that the states were ever sovereign entities) and
John Calhoun at the other extreme (insisting that the states were and
remained sovereign entities. Farber aligns himself with the
"transformational view" that the states once possessed sovereignt y but
the Constitution created a "new sovereign .. . a new social compact
among the American people as a whole" (p. 30). Stated in these terms,
the middle position is so uncontroversial that it is uncertain who could
quibble with it. Indeed, one question is whether Lincoln genuinel y
believed the position set forth in the Jul y 4, 1861, Special Address to
Congress, in which he so intransigentl y denied an y independent status
to the states prior to the ratification of the Constitution. One
possibilit y is that Lincoln's speeches are best understood in the

19. Some states had more meaningful claims to an independent status than others. The
state of Virginia, for example, declared its independence from the Crown in June 1776, and
even enacted its own Bill of Rights and Constitution. Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, is
generally dismissive of Virginia's 1776 Constitution. See Thomas Jefferson, Note on the State
of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 153-76 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1986),
but his view was likely a minority one at the time. See K.R. CONSTANTINE GUTZMAN, OLD
DOMINION, NEW REPUBLIC: MAKING VIRGINIA REPUBLICAN, 1776-1840, at 10-13
(University of Virginia Doctoral Dissertation, 1999). The view that Virginia, as well as the
other colonies, were independent sovereigns prior to the formation of the Union, was
adopted by Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase thirty years later:
In June, 1776, the convention of Virginia formally declared Virginia was a free, sovereign,
and independent state; and on the4th of July, 1776, following, the United States, in Congress
assembled, declared the Thirteen United Colonies free and independent states; and that as
such, they had full power to levy war, conclude peace, etc. I consider this as a declaration,
not that the United Colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were independent states, etc.
but that each of them was a sovereign and independent state, that is, that each of them had a
right to govern itself by its own authority, and its own laws, without any control from any
other power upon earth.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 224 (1796).
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context in which the y were delivered - that is, as political speeches,
not law-review articles. His imperative need in the spring of 1861 was
to rall y the Union to war; and in such endeavors political leaders need
to make the most persuasive arguments, which ma y not be the
intellectuall y soundest.
Another possibilit y, suggested b y Akhil Amar, is that Lincoln's
background as a man of the frontier, a mongrel descendant of men
and women of assorted states and federal territories, clouded his
judgment and rendered him disposed to conclude that the "Union did
indeed come first logicall y and chronologicall y" to the states.20 What at
first glance seems problematic about Amar's suggestion is that persons
with self-awareness eventuall y cast aside, to some extent, their own
heritage in grasping at ultimate truths; and Lincoln was, in terms of
self-awareness, off the charts.21 Then again, perhaps towering geniuses
have blind spots that we lesser mortals are spared. As Alexander
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederac y and one-time friend of
Lincoln, said of him: "The Union, with him, in sentiment rose to the
sublimit y of a religious m ysticism."22
B.

From the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to the Nullification
Crisis

In Chapter Three, Lincoln recedes from the scene, and Farber
bustles the reader through a collection of debates in the earl y republic
over the relative status of the states and the federal government.
Farber here casts Madison, Hamilton, John Marshall, and Joseph
Stor y on one side, defending the federal government; John Calhoun
on the other side, asserting the prerogatives of the states; and
Jefferson flitting here and there with no discernible compass to
guide him.23
20. Akhil Reed Amar, The David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American
Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1126. Amar elaborates:
[Lincoln's] forbears came from several states - Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
possibly New England as well, though Lincoln was not quite sure. He himself had lived in
three states - born in Kentucky, moving to Indiana at age seven, and then on to Illinois as a
young man. . . . . When we remember where Lincoln was quite literally coming from, it is
easier to understand (whether or not we ultimately endorse) his repeated insistence that
"[t]he Union is much older than the Constitution. "
Id.
21. Consider his Lyceum Address of 1838, delivered when he was only 28 years old, on
the amorality of ambition. Lincoln's speech is almost surely an oblique critique of the
potential dangers men such as himself, men of "towering ambition," may pose to the
established social order.
22 . ALEXANDER STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN
THE STATES (1868).
23. As Madison delicately noted of his good friend, "Allowances also ought to be made
for a habit in Mr. Jefferson as in others of great genius of expressing in strong and round
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The Chapter opens with a discussion of the Kentuck y and Virginia
Resolutions, drafted in protest to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798
b y Jefferson and Madison respectivel y (pp. 45-50). Although both
resolutions argued that states can evaluate for themselves the
constitutionalit y of federal laws, Farber arg ues that the y fell short of
asserting a right b y an individual state to annul a federal law . The
power asserted b y the states in those Resolutions nonetheless proved
irksome to federal courts, as Farber then shows (pp . 50-57). Led b y
John Marshall2 4 and Joseph Stor y,25 courts asserted jurisdiction over
the states whenever issues of federal law were raised, establishing a
power that was probabl y implicit in the text of the Constitution26 and
avowed b y Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist.27 In this respect, the
Supreme Court fulfilled the fears of the Anti-Federalists who argued
that the Court would promote the growth of the national government
b y giving a sweeping interpretation to its enumerated powers.28
Farber then turns to the nullification crisis of 1832, in which
Calhoun renewed and extended the logic of the Kentuck y and
Virginia Resolutions (pp. 57-62). In quarrels with President Jackson,
John Calhoun argued that an individual state should be authorized to
nullif y a fe deral law. Calhoun's nullification theor y was self
consciousl y offered as an improvement upon the Constitution, rather
than the realization of its original understanding, b y providing
additional assurances against the t yrann y of the majorit y.29 Jackson's
colorful response was to threaten to hang Calhoun from the nearest
tree. Elder-statesman Madison supplied counterarguments of a more
intellectuall y satisf ying nature (pp. 62-69). Disma yed b y the use
Calhoun had made of his Virginia Resolutions, a repentant Madison
terms, impressions of the moment." P. 68 (quoting a letter from James Madison to Nicholas
Trist (May 1832)).
24. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 285 (1821) (arguing that the Union "would be a
mere shadow, that must disappoint all [the peoples'] hopes, unless invested with large
portions of that sovereignty which belongs to independent States").
25. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 343 (1816) (arguing that the under the
Constitution "the states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty").
26. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
28. See Essays of Brutus, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 163 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985)
("[T]he judicial power of the United States will lean strongly in favor of the general
government and will give such an explanation [of] the constitution, as will favor an extension
of its jurisdiction."); cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
29. Farber suggests a lineage for the states-rights views of Justice Thomas in the thought
of antebellum states-rights thinkers such as Calhoun. Pp. 26-27. Calhoun's influence on
modern legal thought can perhaps be more vividly seen among those thinkers and jurists
who espouse a "living constitution," and specifically those who have argued that the original
constitutional scheme insufficiently protects minority rights. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph
of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1077, 1140 & n.303 (drawing upon Calhoun's theory of concurrent majorities).
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clarified that nothing in them was intended to support a
"constitutional right in an individual State to arrest b y force the
operation of a law of the U.S." (pp. 69) . Whatever the merits of
nullification as a check against majorit y t yrann y, one can reject it as
not contemplated b y the Constitution: to permit an y state to refuse to
enforce a federal law and yet to remain in the Union and draw all the
usual benefits of statehood would transfigure the constitutional order,
effectivel y trumping the amendment process.
Farber's account of the nullification debates is elucidating, but the
significance of this Chapter within the book's larger argument is
unclear. Of course, what Madison and Hamilton thought at the time
the y participated in drafting the Constitution, as well as afterwards, is
important. But insofar as we seek to recover the original
understanding of the Constitution, their views need not be dispositive.
One should consult the writings of Madison and Hamilton, Justice
Scalia has argued, "not because the y were Framers . . . but rather
because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed
people of the time, displa y how the text of the Constitution was
originall y understood."30
Yet one might wonder just how t ypical their views in fact were in
1787. Indeed, Madison and Hamilton were relative outliers in their
da y insofar as the y wished to dismantle the states and exalt the federal
government. Madison, we should recall, proposed that Congress have
the power to veto all state laws; and the Philadelphia Convention's
rejection of this constitutional provision led Madison to despair at the
final product in a somewhat mournful letter to Jefferson written
immediatel y after the Convention. We law professors tend to indulge
the habit of citing the writings of Madison and Hamilton (especiall y
The Federalist) as if it were a conclusive interpretative source, when in
realit y the median vote r in 1 787 might well have diverged significantl y
from the Constitution's nominal "fathers" as regards its meaning and
intent. 31
Indeed, it is striking that, whatever Madison's views on the issues,
significant elements have clamored for nullification and even secession
virtuall y from the republic's inception. In 1803, several representatives
from New England declared that the y wanted out, appalled b y the
Louisiana Purchase and fearful that it portended a reduction of their
power in the Union. The most significant New England secession
movement - in 1815 - resulted in a convention and a list of demands

30. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW38 (1997).
31. This point is suggested in Kevin Gutzman's review of Farber's book. See Kevin R.C.
Gutzman, Book Review, L. & POL. BOOK REV., Jan. 2004, at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/
lpbr/subpages/reviews/Farber10 4.htm.
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on President Madison. 32 Some modern-da y observers, such as Farber,
follow Lincoln33 and tend to suggest that Calhoun was the nefarious
popularizer of the secession hoax, when the fact is that secessionists
are as old as the republic itself.
Furthermore, there is a common assumption that secessionists
were on the margins, whereas the mainstream was reflected in the
thought of people like Joseph Stor y, whose 1830 Commentaries on the
Constitution downpla yed the status of the states and foreclosed a right
of secession.3 4 But this ma y simpl y be a case of winners writing the
histories, for a once-respected, but now largel y forgotten, constitu
tional treatise in 1825 asserted that the states had the right to secede.35
Furthermore, our nation's most renowned foreign observer, Alexis de
Tocqueville, who visited America in 1825, seemed to lend credence to
the secessionist argument: "If toda y one of these same states wanted
to withdraw its name from the contract, it would be quite difficult to
prove that it could not do so. To combat it, the federal government
would have no evident support in either force or right." 36

32. Report of the Hartford Convention (1815), in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY
SOURCES 447-57 (Bruce Fronhnen ed., 2002).
33. Lincoln clearly had Calhoun in mind when he launched into an attack on architects
of secession theory in his Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861).
Secessionists, Lincoln wrote, "invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was
followed by perfectly logical steps, through all the incidents, to the complete destruction of
the Union." Id.
34. Story argued:
Whatever, then, may be the theories of ingenious men on the subject, it is historically true,
that before the declaration of independence these colonies were not, in any absolute sense,
sovereign states; that that event did not find them or make them such; but that at the
moment of their separation they were under the dominion of a superior controlling national
government, whose powers were vested in and exercised by the general congress with the
consent of the people of all the states.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 202
(1830); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A
Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1303-06 (1985) (summarizing Story's criticisms of
nullification and secession arguments).
35. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 211-17 (1825), available at http://www.constitution.org/wr/rawle_32.htm (arguing
that if "the people of a state should determine to retire from the Union," the national
government could not prevent them).
36. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 354 (Harvey c. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop trans., 2000). The famous English lawyer Lord Brougham similarly wrote:
There is not, as with us, a government only and its subjects to be regarded; but a number of
Governments, of States having a separate and substantive, and even independent
existence. . . It is plainly impossible to consider the Constitution which professes to govern
this Union, this Federacy of States, as anything other than a treaty.
.

HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 336 (2d ed. 1849), quoted in Donald
W. Livingston, The Secession Tradition in America, in SECESSION, STATE & LIBERTY 13
(David Gordon ed., 2002).
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Secession as a Constitutional Right

In Chapt er Four, Farb er turns to th e qu estion of s ec ession prop er,
which h e not es "is actuall y a tough er l egal issu e than nullification . . . .
Compar ed with nullification, s ec essionism r equir es l ess distortion of
th e constitutional structur e - it m er el y adds an exit option" (p. 70).
Various constitutions hav e affirm ed, som e dising enuousl y, th e
propri et y of s ec ession. Th e Constitution of th e U.S.S.R., for exampl e,
provid ed that " [ e]ach Union R epublic shall r etain th e right fr eel y to
s ec ed e from th e USSR. "37 Th e propos ed Constitution of th e Europ ean
Union lik ewis e provid es that " [a]n y M emb er Stat e ma y d ecid e to
withdraw from th e Europ ean Union in accordanc e with its own
constitutional r equir em ents."38 A comm ent on this s ection not es that
"man y [draft ers] consid er that it is possibl e to withdraw ev en in th e
abs enc e of a sp ecific provision to that effect. "39 Ind eed, th e draft ers of
th e Conf ed erat e Constitution d elib erat el y omitt ed an y r ef er enc e to a
right of s ec ession b ecaus e its inclusion might sugg est that th e right was
not implicit in th e Unit ed Stat es Constitution. 40
Although th e t ext of th e U.S. Constitution is sil ent on th e qu estion
of a stat e's right to s ec ed e, Farb er argu es that it "looks much mor e
lik e an organic docum ent . . . than a tr eat y" (p. 81). Although tru e, th e
qu estion r emains: which t extual provisions so thoroughl y evisc erat e
th e sov er eignt y of th e stat es that th ey ar e no long er entitl ed to r e
claim th eir sov er eignt y? Farb er not es that th e Constitution's pr eambl e
sp eaks of a " 'mor e p erfect Union.' . . . [Additionall y, t]h e Articl es of
Confed eration claim ed 'to b e p erp etual,' and a mor e t emporar y union
could hardl y b e consid er ed mor e p erfect than a p erman ent on e"
(p. 86). On e could count er b y noting that th e authors of th e
Constitution d eclin ed to includ e th e word "p erp etual," which, in
contrast, app ears s ev eral tim es in th e Articl es of Confed eration.
P erhaps this d elib erat e omission r efl ect ed sh eepishn ess at th e fact that
l ess than a d ecad e aft er ent ering into a "p erp etual" union, Am ericans
dismantl ed that gov ernm ent to form anoth er, mor e p erfectl y d esign ed
to promot e th e public good. Furth ermor e, Farb er's claim that a
p erp etual political union is n ec essaril y "mor e p erfect" s eems d eepl y
37. KONST. SSSR (Constitution (Fundamental Law)] art. 72 (U.S.S.R. 1977), available at
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html.
38. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, art. 1-59.
39. Id. Comment on Article 1-59. It should be noted that some members of the body
drafting the Constitution have opposed this provision. See, e.g., Ernani Lopes & Manuel
Lobo Antunes, Suggestion for amendment of Article 1-59, at http://european-convention.eu.
int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/46_Artl%2059%20Lopes%20EN.pdf ("(W)e propose that this article
be deleted. In our view, the nature of the Union is not compatible with such an exit
clause.").
40. See CONFEDERATE CONST. (1861), available at http://www.usconstitution.com/
ConfederateConstitution.htm.
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Hobbesian in its preference for order - any political order - to the
instability that may arise when people seek to improve their political
condition.
Farber also suggests that the Constitution's Supremacy Clause41
weighs against a right of secession. As he persuasively notes, those
defending the right of secession must read this clause with the proviso,
"except an ordinance of secession" (p. 87). Yet one could argue, as in
fact Farber does earlier, that " [s]ecessionist theory . . . is not
inconsistent with a qualified form of federal supremacy. Under this
view, a state must fully comply with federal law so long as it remains in
the Union, just as a citizen must comply with federal law or emigrate
elsewhere" (p. 70). Similarly, with respect to the Republican
Guarantee Clause42 one could argue that the most natural reading of
the clause is that the states, as long as they are part of the Union, must
maintain a "republican" form. It is, moreover, doubtful that the
Republican Guarantee Clause supplied any ammunition for an
invasion of the South, given that the states that comprised the
Confederacy were "republican" in form, at least as the framers of the
Constitution understood the term. To be sure, slavery existed in the
southern states, but it also existed in most of the states in 1787, which
apparently did not disrupt the framers' belief - however jarring to the
modem observer - that slavery and republicanism can co-exist. For
that matter, Delaware was a slave state that remained in the Union,
and Lincoln never abolished slavery there. 43 Indeed, the Republican
Guarantee Clause might well cut in favor of a right of secession, for it
suggests that the federal government does not have the authority to
impose an undemocratic government on a state when the majority of
its citizens have voted to secede. 44
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land .. . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
42. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4, cl. 1. Lincoln stated:
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, that "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government." But, if
a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may also discard the republican
form of government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable means, to the end, of
maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the
indispensable means to it, are also lawful and obligatory.
Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3.
43. The Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves only in the "States and parts of
States . . . in rebellion against the United States." See President Abraham Lincoln,
Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), available at http://www.founding.com/library/
lbody.cfm?id=328&parent=63. Thus it did not emancipate slaves in the Union states or in
those portions of Confederate states that were by 1863 under Union control.
44. One could question, as Lincoln did, whether a majority of voters in each of the
Southern states really were in favor of secession. See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra
note 3 ("The border States, so called, were not uniform in their action; some of them being
almost for the Union, while in others - as Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
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Farber also draws upon Article IV, section 3,45 which prohibits a
state from carving out a new state within its borders, as a rejection of
the "right of self-determination for localities" (p. 86). Indeed, if the
secession argument rests at bottom on the principle of self
determination, it is hard to see how a government founded on the
consent of the governed can long endure; and it was in this respect
that Lincoln was apt to equate the principle of secession with anarchy.
If South Carolina can withdraw from the Union, can Charleston
secede from South Carolina, and a neighborhood from Charleston,
and a block from the neighborhood, until each individual sets himself
up as his own sovereign? But this argument is not entirely true to the
secessionist position, which emphasizes the special status of the states
as independently sovereign prior to the Union. As Jefferson Davis
argued, secession "is . . . justified upon the basis that the States are
sovereign. . . . [E]ach State is sovereign, and thus may reclaim the
grants that it has made to any agent whomsoever."46 South Carolina
thus stands in a different relation vis-a-vis the United States than
Charleston to South Carolina.
Having scoured the constitutional text for evidence against a right
of secession, Farber then takes a peek at the ratification debates.
There too the striking fact is the almost-total silence on the question.
Farber unearths an interesting morsel to buttress the argument that
the ratifiers of the Constitution assumed there was no right of
secession reserved in the states (p. 88). In the ratification debate in
New York, outnumbered Federalists were tempted to ratify the
Constitution, contingent on Congress's holding another constitutional
convention to consider amendments. Hamilton sought guidance from
Madison, who responded that a "conditional ratification" was
unacceptable: "The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, and for
ever" (p. 88). Significantly, Hamilton read Madison's letter aloud at
the convention, so there is some basis for imputing Madison's view
"The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, and for ever"
to the
narrow majority in New York that ratified the Constitution.
This is just one incident, however, so it is unclear how much weight
it should be accorded. Furthermore, Farber fails to note that three
states included a proviso when ratifying the Constitution specifically
reserving a power to terminate the constitutional project. Virginia's
reservation, for example, provided: "The powers granted under the
-

-

Arkansas - the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced."). And, of course, one
could further note that a proper tabulation of the relevant voting pool in each of the
seceding states should have included women and slaves.
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new States shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . .").
46. MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY
INTO AMERICAN CONSITUTIONALISM 16-17 (1991) (quoting Jefferson Davis).
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Constitution being derived from the people of the United States may
be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to injury
and oppression."47 To be sure, this "reservation" clause is best
understood as an affirmation not of Virginia's right to secede, but of a
right of rebellion retained by all Americans, consistent with basic
Lockean theory and the Declaration of Independence. A right of
rebellion means that one is prepared to put oneself at war with the
sovereign, with all the attendant consequences, if he threatens your
life or property. Secession theory posits, to the contrary, a peaceful
exit option in which a majority in one region can withdraw from the
Union, and the rest of the Union must submit to its dissolution
without resort to violence. Though the two are distinct, modern-day
neo-secessionists and Lincoln detractors sometimes conflate them.48
That said, it remains noteworthy that three states saw fit to emphasize
the right of rebellion when ratifying the Constitution; and it is at least
possible, especially when one recalls just how narrow the votes in
favor of ratification were in several states, that the median voter at the
time had a confused sense that individual states retained something
like a right of withdrawal or secession.
In this vein, a provocative essay by James Ostrowski poses the
following thought experiment. Imagine that the Constitution included
an Article VIII, which provided:
Section 1. No State may ever secede from the Union for any reason,
except by an amendment pursuant to Article V.
Section

2.

If any State attempts to secede without authorization, the

Federal Government shall invade such State with sufficient military force
to suppress the attempted secession.
Section 3. The Federal Government may require the militias of all states
to join in the use of force against the seceding State.
Section

4.

After suppressing said secession, the Federal Government

shall rule said State by martial law until such time as said State shall
accept permanent federal supremacy and alter its constitution to forbid
4
future secessions. 9

47. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia (June 26, 1788), http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratva.htm.
48. Harry Jaffa made this point strenuously in a debate with Thomas DiLorenzo. Harry
V. Jaffa & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Real Abraham Lincoln: A Debate, Debate before the
Independent Institute (May 7, 2002), at http://www.independent.org/tii/forums/020507ipf
Trans.html.
49. James Ostrowski, Was the Union Army's Invasion of the Confederate States a Lawful
Act?: An Analysis of President Lincoln's Legal Arguments Against Secession, in SECESSION,
STATE & LIBERTY 178-79 (David Gordon ed., 2002).
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For Lincoln, such an article was implicit in the U.S. Constitution. And
yet, had such an article been explicit in 1787, one might wonder
whether the Constitution would have been ratified. Would the
marginal voter have been deterred by the presence of such an article
explicitly foreclosing secession and laying out the consequences to a
state that asserted such a right?
On the other hand, as Farber notes, Lincoln's predecessor, James
Buchanan, coined an almost equally persuasive thought experiment in
rejecting a constitutional right of secession. Assume, Buchanan
argued, that the Constitution had included an implicit right of
secession. If so, surely the defenders of the Constitution, in the midst
of heated ratification debates, would have noted this to defuse
criticism: "What a crushing argument," Buchanan argued, "this
[would] have proved against those who dreaded that the rights of the
States would be endangered by the Constitution" (p. 88). Although
Buchanan's argument has been seconded enthusiastically by Akhil
Amar,50 one could easily tum the tables on Buchanan and Amar and
ask: why did the Federalists not state clearly that there was no such
right of secession, especially if, as Amar argues, " [o]ne of the
Federalists' paramount goals was to constitute their new system in a
way that would give no color to later state claims of a right to
secede?"51 The answer may be that the Federalists assumed that they
would lose critical support were they to insistently spell out their
intention - an intention that was likely obvious to sensible observers
- that the ratification was indeed "in toto and for ever." As Thomas
Macaulay has written of the English constitutional settlement of 1689:
the statesmen responsible for the settlement "cared little whether their
major [premise] agreed with their conclusion if their major secured
two hundred votes, and the conclusion two hundred more."52
D.

Secession as Rebellion and the Power of Coercion

In Chapter Six, Farber turns to the question of whether, apart from
legal considerations, the South could assert what Locke called a "right
of rebellion." Even if we conclude that the Constitution does not
authorize secession, one could argue that any nation "conceived," as
Lincoln would say, by the Declaration of Independence, could not

50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1462
n.162 (1987) ("The strongest historical evidence against secession, however, was not what
the Federalists said but what they did not say. To my knowledge, no major proponent of the
Constitution sought to win over states' rightists by conceding that states could unilaterally
nullify or secede.").
51. Id.
52. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND Vol. II, 438 (N.Y.: Am.
News Co.).
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permanently foreclose withdrawal.53 Yet Lincoln announced in his
July 4 special address: "I hold that, in contemplation of universal law
and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual.
Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all
national governments." Whenever a politician, even one as justly
celebrated as Lincoln, references a "universal law," one is advised at a minimum - to clutch one's wallet: Precisely what universal law
did Lincoln have in mind that justifies subservience to a government
that a segment of the population no longer deems legitimate? What
makes Lincoln's invocation of a "universal law" in 1861 initially
puzzling is not only his famous and oft-repeated admiration for the
Declaration of Independence, but also Lincoln's own words as a
member of Congress during the Mexican-American War. Then, as
Farber notes, Lincoln said:
Any people anywhere . . . being inclined and having the power, have the

right to rise up, and shake off the existing government, and form a new
one that suits them better. . . . Any portion of such people that can, may
revolutionize, and make their own, of so much of the territory as they
inhabit. (p. 106)

According to Jefferson Davis, the southern states "merely asserted the
right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1 776, defined
to be 'inalienable' " (p. 101).
Farber considers "the Southern grievances that might justify a
right to revolution" (p. 102), and finds them wanting. After dismissing
the tariff controversy as a mere "irritant," Farber concludes that
slavery was the central issue separating South and North (pp. 102-05).
In the words of a leading historian on the Civil War, "What were these
rights and liberties for which Confederates contended? The right to
own slaves; the liberty to take this property into the territories;
freedom from the coercive powers of a centralized government. " 54
Judged by the standards of contemporary international law, the
South's claims of "self-determination," would, Farber argues, not fare
well. He considers a recent opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court
assessing Quebec's right to secede, and identifies three principal
criteria to be used when evaluating any peoples' claim to sever ties
with an existing government: is the people seeking self-determination
a colony subject to foreign subjugation; has the people unambiguously
asserted its will to secede; and will the people protect the "rights of
minorities."55 As Farber notes, the South cannot be seriously viewed

53. As Farber notes, "Southerners who were skeptical of the constitutionality of
secession frequently invoked the right of revolution instead." P. 101.
54. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM 241 (1988).
55. Pp. 110-12 (quoting Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 264,
267-73).
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as a "colony," and even assuming its will to secede was unambiguous,
it fails under the final criteria: " [whereas] the Canadian Supreme
Court stressed that a seceding region must respect the rights of
others . . . a major purpose of Southern secession was to ensure that
white Southerners could freely deprive blacks of fundamental human
rights" (p. 1 1 1) .
But one should recall that the Revolutionaries of 1776 did not have
clean hands as far as slavery is concerned. They rebelled and promptly
established a political union, one purpose of which was "to ensure that
white southerners could freely deprive blacks of fundamental human
rights." Should we say that the Revolution of 1776 was illegitimate?
The first emancipation proclamation on American soil was issued not
by Abraham Lincoln in 1863, but by the English governor of Virginia,
Lord Dunmore, in 1775, who promised slaves their freedom if they
joined the royalist cause. As a recent historian has tartly noted, " [i]t is
not sufficient to say . . . that slaves and Indians were denied the fruits
of Independence. To a large extent, in 1776 and 1861, slaves and
Indians - or more precisely, the Indians' land and the slaves' labor were the fruits of Independence."56 I do not want to press this thesis
too far. The fact remains that although the Constitution permits
slavery, it nonetheless avoids mention of the word, perhaps suggesting
an element of shame; by contrast, the Confederate Constitution
enthusiastically uses the word "slave" or some variant.57
Again, it is difficult to view sympathetically the South's rebellion
against the Union, entangled as its claims were with the cause of
slavery. But what if the institution of slavery had not existed in the
South, and the tariff to protect Northern manufactures had been the
South's principal grievance? If the Revolutionaries of 1776 rebelled in
part because of ill-gotten taxes, why couldn't the Confederacy in 1861?
Or to return to the hypothetical introducing this review: Had
Breckinridge won the election of 1860 and had seven states seceded,
with the Boston Globe announcing that New England was "acting over
again the history of the American Revolution of 1776,"58 would we be
sympathetic to the cause of secession?
56. WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES AND THE
MAKING OF THE REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999).
57. See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 425-26 (2001) (noting that in drafting the Articles of
Confederation, and subsequently the Constitution, the authors "used euphemistic language
referring to slaves as 'other Persons,' " in part because Northern delegates, in the words of
William Patterson of New Jersey, "had been ashamed to use the term 'Slaves' & had
substituted a description"). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3 (stating that representation
and taxes for each state shall be based on the addition to the number of free persons "three
fifths of all other Persons") (emphasis added), with CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3
(1861) (using verbatim language, except in the last phrase, where it states "three-fifths of all
slaves" ) (emphasis added).
58. P. 102 (quoting an editorial in the New Orleans Picayune) .
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To answer questions of this sort, Farber might have found it
productive to consider the Lockean underpinnings of the Declaration
of Independence. For Locke, whenever the political authorities
" endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to
reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves
into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from
any farther Obedience."59 Locke considers the objection that his
teaching "lays a foundation for Rebellion,"ffi because "no Government
will be able long to subsist, if the People may set up a new Legislative,
whenever they take offense at the old one."61 But according to Locke,
men are more cautious than that, often preferring to bear present ills
than cast their fortunes on uncertain enterprises, and are inclined to
resort to revolution only as a last resort.62 Locke then considers who
shall judge whether the prince is using his prerogative properly in
furtherance of the common good, or is transgressing the laws and
imperiling the lives and property of the subjects. Locke's terse answer
to this question is, " The People shall be Judge."63 And to the objection
that this is to say that there is no judge at all, Locke persists: "{E]very
Man is Judge for himself . . . whether another hath put himself into a
State of War with him."64
What guidance does this provide? First, Locke apparently
disagrees with Lincoln's claims that "the central idea of secession is
the essence of anarchy."65 Locke seems to think that perpetuity is not
implied in the fundamental law of all national governments," nor is
there necessarily any danger in teaching men that revolution is always
an option; for the fact remains that men are not promiscuously
inclined to exercise such a right. Lincoln's emphasis on perpetuity is
consistent with Madison's hope that the Constitution remain
unchallenged, and thereby come to enjoy the "veneration which time
bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."66 There
is a value, at least in terms of stability, in enshrouding any regime's
founding principles in a sacredness that numbs critical thought, and it
59. JO HN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 305, § 228, at 460-62 (rev. ed. 1963).
60. Id. § 228.
61. Id. § 223.
62. Id. § 225 ("Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient Laws,
and all the slips of human frailty will be born by the People, without mutiny or murmur.").
63. Id. § 240.
64. Id. § 241.

65. Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 16; see also Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra
note 3 ("The principle itself is one of disintegration.").
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
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is possible that Locke, and to a greater extent Jefferson, who spoke
glowingly of a constitutional convention every twenty years,
understated this fact. Second, Locke seems to suggest that, contra
Farber, we cannot evaluate the claimed justifications for revolution.
Fundamentally, it is not for another to second-guess whether one man
thinks his life or property is threatened: he is the only judge.
And yet it is unclear what, in the end, is achieved by an appeal to a
right of revolution. One might consider the possibility that the South
had a "right" to "rebel" and form its own government under some
higher law, but the North was also perfectly within its constitutional
rights to seek to preserve the Union, if it deemed it to be
advantageous. To this possibility, one might respond that it makes no
sense to speak of a "right" to secede unless a correlative duty is
imposed on the remaining states to respect that right - that is, to
acquiesce in the dismemberment of the Union. Yet where would such
a duty come from, and what power would exist to punish those who
disregard it? The revolutionaries of 1776 may well have had a "right"
to form a new government, but George III was surely entitled to
dispatch armies to preserve the Empire. Likewise, even assuming that
the Confederate states had a "right" to rebel, can one fault Lincoln for
seeking to preserve the country as it existed prior to his inauguration?
The hard question is perhaps not whether George III and
Abraham Lincoln had a legal right to suppress a rebellion; the ques
tion is whether, as a prudential matter, they should have done so, even
if we assume they possessed the requisite legal authority. Edmund
Burke famously argued that George III would have been better
advised to conciliate with the American revolutionaries than fight
them; and Burke's name, not to mention the course of events, lends
retrospective luster to this argument. Unfortunately, the man most
closely associated with a prudential argument against suppressing the
southern rebellion was Lincoln's predecessor, James Buchanan, widely
dismissed by historians as among our nation's worst chief executives.
Farber considers Buchanan's argument that, on the one hand, the
South did not have a right to secede, but, on the other, the federal
government did not have the legal authority to invade those states (pp.
94-101). He concludes that Buchanan's argument falls flat.67

67. Farber relies principally upon Article I, section 8, clause 15, which authorizes
Congress to "call[] forth the Militia to . . . suppress Insurrections." President Buchanan's
Attorney General Black argued that this clause must be read in tandem with Article IV,
section 4, which provides that the federal government "shall protect each of [the states]
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." Black concluded that ·absent
some request from the state, the federal government could not call forth the militia. Farber
counters that Black's argument erroneously assumed that "insurrection" in Article I and
"domestic violence" in Article IV have identical meanings. Pp. 98-99.
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But the prudential argument against an invasion should not be
lightly dismissed. Given what Farber calls the "human price of
coercion" (p. 93), one might wonder whether it would be better if a
president confronted by a substantial secession movement simply let
the states go in peace. Farber considers this important issue in a few
paragraphs (pp. 1 12-14), but statements of two former presidents
provide additional guidance. In a letter in 1816, Thomas Jefferson
mused that " [i]f any State in the Union will declare that it prefers
separation [to a continuance in union] . . . I have no hesitation in
saying, 'Let us separate.' "68 John Quincy Adams elaborated on this
view at a celebration for the fiftieth anniversary of Washington's
inaugural in 1839:
But the indissoluble link of union between the people of the several

States of this confederated nation, is after all, not in the right, but in the
heart. If the day should ever come, (may Heaven avert it,) when the
affections of the people of these states shall be alienated from each

other; when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or
collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the bands of political
-association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the
magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and far better
will it be for the people of the disunited states, to part in friendship from
each other, than to be held together by constraint.69

Neither Jefferson nor Adams suggested that states had a right,
grounded in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence,
to secede. Indeed, Adams specifically disclaimed a right of secession
later in his inaugural speech: "In the calm hours of self-possession, the
right of a state to nullify an act of Congress, is too absurd for
argument, and too odious for discussion. The right of a state to secede
from the union is equally disowned by the principles of the
Declaration of Independence. "70 His point was simply that if the states
should ever cease to be united by interest and opinion, the best
outcome would be to split apart. Furthermore, there is evidence that
this was precisely the view held by Framers such as James Madison,
who at the Philadelphia Convention argued against a provision
"authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole [against] a
delinquent state." In his notes, Madison "observed that the more he
reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability,
the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively
and not individually."71

68. Letter from Jefferson to W. Crawford (June 20, 1816), quoted in Ostrowski, supra
note 49, at 175 n.60.
69. President John Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse (Apr. 30,
1839), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/misc/1839-jub.htm.
70. Id.
71. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
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Why, then, questions of right and law aside, did Lincoln not simply
let the South go in peace? According to Lincoln, the peaceful
coexistence of North and South was not a realistic option. By 1 861, the
assets of North and South were so interspersed that one party could
not, as in a unilateral and no-fault divorce, simply opt out. Lincoln
explained in the First Inaugural:
Physically

speaking,

we

cannot

separate.

We

cannot

remove

our

respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall
between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the
presence, and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of
our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and
intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them.

Lincoln is correct that the North and South would remain face to face,
but so what? Norway and Sweden remained face to face after the
former seceded from the latter in 1905, and the two Scandinavian
countries, stranded on the same peninsula, each with rich and
belligerent histories, have yet to come to blows. Nor has it been
deemed necessary to erect an "impassable wall between them." It has
been, as the modern expression goes, an amicable divorce - they get
along better separately than they did together.
One difference between Norway's secession in 1905 and the
South's in 1 861 is that Norway peacefully negotiated its independence,
whereas the South initiated its assertion of self-rule with a flurry of
cannon balls. Really, what do you expect when you shell a nation's
fort - that it would lightly dismiss the incident and wish you bon
voyage? It may not satisfy the legal casuists, but Farber's conclusion
has a certain plausibility: " [O]ne fact is crucial. It was the Confederacy
that fired the first shot. After that happened, war was inevitable, just
as it would have been if the French or Russian military had sacked a
U.S. fort" (p. 1 1 4). Yet we cannot quite leave it at that. The war fervor
that erupted in the North after the firing on Fort Sumter surely made
it likely that a war between the states would ensue, but whether it was
inevitable, as Farber suggests, is another story. Tocqueville applauded
President Washington for resisting the popular enthusiasm for war
with England in the late eighteenth century,72 and it is at least
conceivable that an energetic president, such as Lincoln, could have
restrained the dogs of war. His decision not to do so must have been
based not only on his legal judgment about secession, but also on his
prudential view that, despite the great costs of war, the Union was
worth preserving.

REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON: MAY 31 (1787), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
debates/ 531.htm (last modified Aug. 2, 2004).
72. See Tocqueville, supra note 36, at 218.
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CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING CIVIL W AR

One must include among the costs of the war the damage arguably
inflicted upon the Constitution itself. In order to defend the
Constitution Lincoln often took actions that skirted the outermost
boundaries, and possibly exceeded, his constitutional authority. Farber
divides his analysis of Lincoln's respect for civil liberties into three
parts: to what extent Lincoln exceeded his Article II powers and
encroached on legislative authority (pp. 115-43); to what extent
Lincoln unjustifiably violated "individual rights" (pp. 144-75); and to
what extent Lincoln flouted "the rule of law," which Farber generally
understands to mean judicial decisions (pp. 176-95). Farber's tripartite
division, like that of the Roman Empire, has a grandeur to it but fails
to achieve perfect harmony. For example, Farber omits any discussion
of Lincoln's unilateral executive decision to suspend habeas corpus in
the first section of his discussion (executive power), yet the issue arises
in both the second (individual rights) and third (rule of law) sections
(pp. 157-63, 188-92). I depart below from Farber's thematic plan of
attack and adopt a chronological one, focusing first on Lincoln's
actions at the outbreak of hostilities and then on the fate of civil
liberties in the course of the war.
A.

July 4, 1861 Speech

On April 12, 1861, Confederate forces laid siege to Fort Sumter.
Three days later, Lincoln issued a proclamation summoning the
militia, as well as calling for 75,000 additional troops "to re-possess the
forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union"
(p. 1 17). On April 19, a mob in Baltimore attacked a Massachusetts
regiment on the way to Washington, D .C. (p. 1 17). Lincoln suspended
habeas corpus on the route between Philadelphia and Washington,
ordered a blockade of the South, and authorized the Treasury to
advance $2 million to New York financiers, who were to make
payments to support the incipient war effort (p. 1 18).
Given that the Constitution, directly or indirectly, vests Congress
with the power to appropriate funds,73 call up troops,74 declare war,75
and, in times of "rebellion and invasion," suspend habeas corpus,76

73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
74. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 15 ("Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union.").
75. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11 ("Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.").
76 . U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall

not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may
require it.").
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many of Lincoln's unilateral actions in 1 861 have given rise to
accusations that he exceeded the powers allocated to the executive by
Article II. In his July 4, 1 861, special address to Congress, Lincoln
divided his actions into three groups in terms of their legality. First,
with respect to his decisions to call forth the militia and order a
blockade, Lincoln announced, "So far, all was believed to be strictly
legal."77 He provided no argument, apparently regarding these actions
as self-evidently constitutional. Farber diligently fills in the details, and
notes that in calling forth the militia, Lincoln could have found
support in the Militia Acts of 1798 and 1 802, which authorized the
President to call forth the militia in times of insurrection (p. 132). The
blockade proclamation arguably encroached upon the legislative
power to declare war, but Lincoln apparently assumed that, as
Commander-in-Chief, he could take defensive action in the event of
actual hostilities prior to congressional authorization. Congress
mooted the issue on July 13, 1 861, by formally approving Lincoln's
blockade order, but the owners of three ships seized prior to July 13
took their case to the Supreme Court, which e.ventually sided with
Lincoln 5-4.78 Farber likewise exonerates Lincoln on this count, noting
that the Constitution, as originally drafted, authorized Congress to
"make war." According to Madison's notes on the Convention, the
language was amended to "declare war" to leave "to the Executive the
power to repel sudden attacks" (p. 142).
Lincoln's second category of actions consisted of "calls . . . for
volunteers, to serve three years, unless sooner discharged; and also for
large additions to the regular Army and Navy." 79 Of these, Lincoln
said, "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured
upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public
necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the
constitutional competency of Congress." 80 Lincoln thus conceded that
he was on somewhat more doubtful legal grounds here, and it is
significant that he deemed it necessary to seek congressional approval
for the decision to enlarge the army and navy. Although
acknowledging that such actions may have exceeded his Article II
authority, Lincoln downplayed such violations as merely technical
separation-of-powers matters. Lincoln invoked "popular demand" and
"necessity" to justify an assumption not of dictatorial powers - that
is, powers not entrusted to any branch of the federal government but rather of powers ordinarily wielded by the legislature.
77. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3.

78. Pp. 138-43; Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
79. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3.

80. Id.
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Farber judges Lincoln's unauthorized expansion of the regular
army and the diversion of federal funds to the New York financiers to
be "unconstitutional" (pp. 137, 1 49, 192). In reaching this conclusion,
Farber finds that these actions fall within what Justice Jackson in his
Steel Seizure concurrence called "presidential actions contrary to the
expressed will of Congress. "81 Yet Congress had never expressly or
impliedly prohibited Lincoln from taking such action. In his Steel
Seizure concurrence, Jackson emphasized that Congress had
extensively regulated the law of condemnation and seizure, so it was
against that backdrop that he could conclude that Truman had acted
contrary to Congress's will. Farber does not point to any congressional
actions82 that indicated a congressional will to foreclose the
disbursement of funds or expansion of the regular army.83 Indeed,
Congress validated such actions on July 13, 1 86 1 , or almost
immediately upon being called back into session.
Although Farber finds Lincoln's diversion of funds and expansion
of the army to be "unconstitutional," he adds that "it is difficult to
condemn these actions too harshly" (p. 138). But this simply raises the
question: Why would you necessarily want to condemn Lincoln for
these deeds, regardless of their legality? As Farber notes, the situation
in April 1 861 could not be more dire; and unlike the internment of
Japanese Americans in 1942, it is difficult to question the military
necessity of each of Lincoln's actions when hostilities erupted.84 If we
assume that the Union was worth preserving, Lincoln's audacious
actions in April 1 861 seem more worthy of praise than condemnation.
One could respond, however, that the Union was worth preserving,
but only at a certain price. There are marginally desirable objects one
would decline to pay more than a pittance for; and even if we assume

81. P. 136. Jackson distinguished among three kinds of presidential actions: first, those
"pursuant to an express or implied authorization to Congress," which are presumptively
constitutional; second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority"; and third those
directly contrary to a congressional directive, such as Truman's seizure of the steel mills,
which are presumptively unconstitutional. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
82. For example, the Boland Amendments, enacted between 1982 and 1986, tried to
prevent the President from funding the Nicaraguan Contras. See Edwin B. Firmage &
Joseph E. Wrona, The War Power, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1684, 1702 n.124 (1991) (book
review).
83. With respect to the appropriation of $2 million to New York financiers in April to
support the war effort, Farber has seized upon a peccadillo that even the most vehement
Lincoln critics, such as Thomas DiLorenzo, do not bother to include in his list of sins.
84. For example, Farber notes with respect to the diversion of funds, "Lincoln bypassed
normal government channels and used private citizens for these payments because he feared
that much of the bureaucracy was disloyal, Washington being much more of a Southern
town than it is today." P. 118.
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that the Union is inestimably good, perhaps there is a price (in lives,
liberty, and property) that would make its preservation undesirable.85
Finally, we come to Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus. When
the President suspended the writ on April 19, his immediate concern
was to prevent Maryland from seceding, for he did not savor the
prospect of a capital stranded in enemy territory. On May 25, troops
imprisoned John Merryman, a lieutenant in a secessionist cavalry
believed to be responsible for the destruction of bridges and telegraph
wires. The following day, and again on May 28, Chief Justice Taney
issued writs ordering General George Cadwalader at Fort McHenry to
release Merryman. Taney directed that both writs be sent to Lincoln,
in order that he might "fulfill his constitutional obligation, to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed; to determine what measures he
will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected
and enforced."86 Lincoln refused to comply with Taney's orders.
In his July 4, 1861 address to Congress, Lincoln presented a two
fold defense of these actions. First, he emphasized that, given the
exigencies he confronted, he was forced to choose between his
overarching constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be
enforced" and other narrower duties, such as according respect for
habeas corpus protections. Simply put, the greater trumps the smaller:
To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be
violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if
the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
87
disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?

Yet after apparently conceding that he had violated one constitutional
provision, albeit to fulfill another, Lincoln retracted the concession:
"But it was not believed that this question [of whether to break one
law or another] was presented. It was not believed that any law was
violated. "88 Lincoln noted that the Constitution authorizes the
suspension of the writ, and it is "silent as to which, or who, is to
exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a
dangerous emergency."89 At this point, rather than making tiresome
legal arguments (this was a war speech after all), he added, "No more
85. But cf Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) ("Fondly do we
hope - fervently do we pray - that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away.
Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the
lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so
still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.' ").
86. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 153 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
87. Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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extended argument is now offered; as an opinion, at some length, will
probably be presented by the Attorney General."90
Farber judges Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus "on
balance . . . constitutionally appropriate" (p. 1 63) , but he relies on an
argument ignored by Lincoln, at least in the July 4 address. Farber
writes that Congress had enacted Militia Acts authorizing the presi
dent to call forth the militia in areas of insurrection, albeit decades ago
in 1798 and 1802; assuming Maryland was an area of insurrection,
"Lincoln clearly would have been empowered [by the Militia Acts] to
use deadly force to suppress the insurrection [and] the power to detain
dangerous individuals goes along with the power to use deadly
military force against them" (p. 1 62) . Farber also offers a few words in
defense of Lincoln's technical argument that the Constitution does not
directly state that Congress, rather than the President, has the power
to suspend habeas corpus (pp. 160-62) . The stumbling block here, of
course, is that the power to suspend habeas corpus is located in Article
I, not Article II. If one takes the structure of the Constitution
seriously, it is hard to see how the President can claim this power, and
it is revealing that after a sentence or two on this argument, Lincoln
pawned it off on his Attorney General, Edward Bates.
Lincoln, great lawyer that he was, also left to Bates the thorny
question of whether he had shirked his constitutional duty by flouting
a judicial order to release Merryman. Bates soon emerged from the
library with an opinion that, not surprisingly, gave a sweeping
interpretation to executive power. Bates drew upon the sort of
arguments made first in Federalist No. 49, and thereafter by Jefferson
(pardoning those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts) and
Jackson (vetoing the Bank), that the three co-ordinate federal
branches each reserve the right to interpret the Constitution.91 In this
respect, Professor Michael Paulson has coined the phrase "Merryman
power" to refer to a purported executive power to independently
interpret the Constitution and, if necessary, nullify an unconstitutional
judicial decision.92 Yet Paulsen notes that Lincoln did not directly
assert such a power in the July 4, 1 861, speech.93

90. Id.
91. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 85 (1861). Bates wrote:
If it be true, as I have assumed, that the President and the judiciary are co-ordinate
departments of government, and the one not subordinate to the other, I do not understand
how it can be legally possible for a judge to issue a command to the President to come before
him ad subjiciendum - that is, to submit implicitly to his judgment - and, in case of
disobedience, treat him as a criminal, in contempt of a superior authority, and punish him as
for a misdemeanor, by fine and imprisonment.
Id.
92. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993). But see John 0. McGinnis,
Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and
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Lincoln's silence in the July speech contrasts with his explicit
consideration of the binding effect of the Dred Scott decision in the
First Inaugural in April. Then, Lincoln emphasized that he regarded
Dred Scott as wrongly decided, but nonetheless stated,
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that
such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as
to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect
and consideration, in all parallel cases, by all other departments of the
Government.94

Lincoln contrasted the views of "some," who think "constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court," with his own view
that "such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a
suit as to the object of that suit." Even under Lincoln's view,
therefore, he would seem to be bound by Chief Justice Taney's order
in the particular case of John Merryman, although remaining free to
challenge Taney's argument in other cases. Lincoln's refusal to give
effect to Taney's order in Ex Parte Merryman points to a broader
understanding of executive power.
B.

Individual Rights During the War

Turning to the war, Farber begins by considering the legality of
Lincoln's declaration of military rule in the actual theater of war (the
South and border areas) (pp. 146-52). When he turns to the issue of
military trials in the North (pp. 163-70), Farber emphasizes that only a
tiny minority of these trials were conducted far from the scene of war;
and to the extent that generals violated civil liberties, Lincoln
frequently interposed himself on behalf of the victims. Farber explores
the military trial of one Confederate sympathizer, Lambdin Milligan,
in 1864, but Lincoln's role here was tangential and, as Farber notes, he
was poised to issue a pardon when John Wilkes Booth deprived him of
the opportunity (p. 164).
The episode that best captures Lincoln's approach towards civil
liberties in wartime is the 1864 trial of the Ohio pacifist Clement
Vallandigham, who was charged with making speeches that
undermined the war effort (pp. 170-75). After briefly sketching
Lincoln's argument (including the famous rhetorical question "Must I
shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch
a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert?"), Farber

Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 391-96 (1993) (criticizing Paulsen's

argument).
93. Paulsen, supra note 92, at 95.
94. Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 16.
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critiques Lincoln's actions by the standards of twentieth-century First
Amendment jurisprudence. Farber ultimately casts doubt on the value
of this retrospective enterprise.95 Indeed, it might have been more
interesting to delve into the complicated facts of the Vallandigham
case and lay out Lincoln's own understanding of the applicability of
the First Amendment in wartime.96
Protesting various civil rights violations, a group of New York
Democrats wrote to Lincoln in 1863, and alleged that Vallandigham
had been arrested for "no other reason than words addressed to a
public meeting." Lincoln's response acknowledged that, had
Vallandigham been arrested simply for "words addressed to a public
meeting," then "I [would] concede that the arrest was wrong."97
Turning to the broader question of civil liberties in wartime, Lincoln
argued that the Constitution is not "the same, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace
and public security."98 The Constitution itself draws a "distinction,"
Lincoln added, apparently referring to the clause authorizing the
suspension of habeas corpus in times of "rebellion." He wrote,
I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally
take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown
that the same could not lawfully be taken in time of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man,
because it can be shown not to be good for a well one. 99

Then Lincoln scoffed at the objection that, if stretched in times of
crisis, the government will not revert to its original dimensions. Of
course, Lincoln's optimism on this score is not universal; and it is the
received wisdom dating back at least to Locke,100 and doubtless
further, that a government once distended by a strong executive in
time of emergency, never returns to its proper size.101

95. "If the question is whether Lincoln acted in knowing violation of constitutional
standards, it is hard to hold him responsible for failing to anticipate the views that the
Supreme Court itself would not develop until many decades later." P. 173.
96. A recent article thoughtfully explores the issue. Geoffrey R. Stone, Abraham
Lincoln 's First Amendment, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2003).
97. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 266 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1989).
98. Id. at 267.
99. Id.
100. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 166 ("[T]he reigns of good princes have been always most
dangerous to the liberties of their people.").
101. But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56
STAN. L. REV. 605, 625 (2003) ("There just are no systematic trends in the history of civil
liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergencies to
push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion.").
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One of the most interesting features of Lincoln's argument in his
letter to the New York Democrats and in other writings is his
insistence that all of his emergency acts were in a sense constitutional
- that is, his claim that the "Government can constitutionally" take
emergency measures. As Geoffrey Stone has argued in an article on
the Vallandigham affair, Lincoln repeatedly claimed to find
authorization for his actions in particular clauses of the Constitution,
from the "Take Care" Clause to the Habeas Clause to the
Commander-in-Chief Clause.102 One might counter that this is a mere
formality, for these clauses could be construed to authorize nearly any
action in the event of an emergency. Indeed, in practice one might
wonder how different Lincoln's understanding of executive power was
from that of Hamilton, who maintained that the Vesting Clause of
Article II entrusts the executive with discretionary powers to meet any
emergency.103 Or, for that matter, in practice, is Lincoln's argument
different from Jefferson's defenses of executive power, in which he
asserted the President need not obey the Constitution in exceptional
circumstances, but can seek justification in " [t]he laws of necessity"?104
Farber sorts through the various arguments concerning executive
power, but as he aptly notes, theoretical differences seem to have a
way of converging in practice (p. 129). A cynic might wonder whether
the essential truth of the matter is that strong presidents do what they
do and post hoc find rationalizations for their actions. The
rationalizations may differ, but the actions all bespeak obedience to a
higher law than the Constitution, that is, as Locke would say, the
"fundamental law of nature and government, viz. that as much as may
be all m embers of society are to be preserved."105

The different

102. Stone, supra note 96, at 29 ("What impresses most about his handling of the
Vallandigham affair was his persisting concern for harmonizing liberty and power through
constitutional discourse and his unflinching insistence that 'the Constitution mattered.' ).
Farber offers a somewhat different take: "Lincoln was not arguing for the legal power to
take emergency actions contrary to statutory or constitutional mandates. Instead, his
argument fit well within the classic liberal view of emergency power. While unlawful, his
actions could be ratified by Congress if it chose to do so . .. .'' P. 194.
"

103. For a discussion of Hamilton's writings, as the pseudonymous Pacificus, in defense
of President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential
Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 791-96.
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1231 (1984). Jefferson wrote:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good
citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving
our country when in danger, are of a higher obligation. To lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end
to the means.
Id.

105. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 159.
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articulated understandings of executive power of Washington,
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Lincoln provide fodder for law professors to
parse and puzzle over, but - bracing thought - is this largely an
exercise in pointless semantics? Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently
thinks so, for he has concluded that the study of "occasional
presidential excesses and judicial restraint in wartime" is "very largely
academic. There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents
will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt. "106 Lincoln
ignored Taney's order to release John Merryman, and did not even
bother to supply an argument justifying this action. Yes, he ordered
Attorney General Bates to manufacture something to appease the
populace, like a Cesare Borgia dispatching a lieutenant to take the
heat,107 but it is Lincoln's silence here that speaks volumes. He did
what he perceived necessary.
American presidents, before and after Lincoln, seem to have
exercised what John Locke called "prerogative" - " [the] power [of
the executive] to act according to discretion for the public good,
without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it."108

Farber quite correctly notes that Lockean prerogative seems
inconsistent with written constitutionalism {p. 128), but this
inconsistency may well be embedded in the Constitution nonetheless.
The American regime perhaps "constitutionalizes" a power to act
outside the law, which calls to mind what Machiavelli called "virtu," or
farther back still, what Aristotle terms "prudence," the ultimate virtue
of a statesman that is not reducible to general laws.109
Farber glimpses this fact in his conclusion, which emphasizes
Lincoln's personal qualities. He writes, "It was Lincoln's character his ability, judgment, courage, and humanity - that brought the
Union through the war with the Constitution intact" (p. 200). Of
course, this assumes that Lincoln saved the Constitution, rather than
destroyed it. If the Constitution was originally a voluntary association
of separate sovereigns, then he illegally engrossed the nation in a war
that claimed over six hundred thousand lives and destroyed the
economy of much of the nation. We may add violations of civil
liberties to his sins, although at that point it would be hard to plunge
his reputation any farther into disgrace. On the other hand, if Lincoln
was right that the Constitution foreclosed secession and authorized the
use of force to suppress any such movement, the entire problem of

106. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224 (1998).
107. See, e.g., Machiavelli, The Prince, reprinted in THREE RENAISSANCE CLASSICS 1,
31-36 (1953) (describing Ceasare Borgia's use of Remirro de Oreo).
108. LOCKE, supra note 59, § 160.
109. The argument is laid out with great subtlety in HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JR.,
TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989).
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civil liberties needs to be re-gauged. As Richard Posner writes, "If the
Constitution is not to be treated as a suicide pact, why should military
exigencies not influence the scope of the constitutional rights that the
Supreme Court has manufactured from the Constitution's vague
provisions?"110
My own view is that the founders did not think secession was a
constitutional right, but also could not have imagined that the fe deral
government under the Constitution they had created would be so
strong and so motivated as to prevent one-third of the states from
withdrawing and reconstituting a govemment. m I thus think it fair to
say that Lincoln, through the Civil War, effected a shift in the nature
of the regime. Lincoln himself anticipated that a Union victory in the
Civil War would give rise to a " new birth of freedom,"112 and he
essentially cast himself in the role of a founder. The principles on
which the Lincolnian regime were to be founded were not quite iden
tical to those of the original regime, for most importantly the scourge
of slavery would be eliminated. In this respect, as well as in laying the
framework for a decisive shift in the relative power of the state and
Federal Governments, it is perhaps not quite correct to say, as Farber
does, that Lincoln "saved" the Constitution: he transformed it.

110. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
112. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://www.fouding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=329&parent=63 (emphasis added).

